SELF-CATEGORIZATION AND SHARED ATTENTION
More specifically, we anticipate that:
H1a. participants with a low AQ will have an SCI significantly greater than zero, but that participants with a high AQ will not have an SCI significantly different from zero.
H1b: the effect of AQ will be moderated by the degree of covariation across the covariation conditions, such that AQ will be more strongly negatively related to selfcategorization in a moderate covariation condition (where the pattern is difficult to detect), relative to both high and no covariation conditions (where the pattern is easy to detect or there is no pattern to detect).
In line with the suggestion that ASD is characterized by decreased shared attention, we also hypothesize that:
H2. the degree of a person's autistic-like traits will be negatively related to the degree of shared attention with members of their own social category (ingroup), but will not be related to the degree of shared attention with members of the social category to which they did not belong (outgroup).
H2a. there will be a difference between ingroup and outgroup shared attention for participants with a low AQ, but no difference for those with a high AQ, because low-AQ participants will show a bias towards words co-attended by ingroup members, whereas high-AQ participants will show no such bias.
Given that self-categorization is known to be a causal antecedent of shared attention with ingroup members, we also hypothesize that: H3: the SCI will be positively related to ingroup shared attention, but not to outgroup shared attention.
Finally, we hypothesize that: 8 SELF-CATEGORIZATION AND SHARED ATTENTION H4. the relationship between autistic-like traits and ingroup shared attention will disappear, or be attenuated, when participants' SCI is added to the model, thus demonstrating that self-categorization mediates the relationship between autistic-like traits and ingroup shared attention (see Figure 1 for a graphical representation of hypotheses).
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Method
Participants
One hundred and seventy-seven participants were recruited via online crowdsourcing tool Crowdflower. One hundred and forty-five participants generated a valid AutismQuotient score, having provided a response to all 50 items, and were thus retained for all subsequent analyses. Of the final sample, 74 participants were female, 65 were male, and 6 did not indicate their gender. The mean age was 35.52 years with a range from 18 to 72. The research was approved by the Australian National University Human Research Ethics Committee.
Design
The study employed a three-condition (covariation: zero/moderate/high) betweenparticipants design, with participants' AQ included as a continuous predictor. The dependent variables were self-categorization score in the categorization task, and ingroup and outgroup word memory in the shared attention task.
Procedure
The entire study was conducted online, employing Qualtrics survey software to present all stimuli and collect all data.
Phase 1: Avatar Selection. Participants were informed that they would be completing a series of cognitive tasks at the same time as five other participants. They were told that each 9 SELF-CATEGORIZATION AND SHARED ATTENTION participant, including themselves, would be selecting an avatar to represent them throughout the study. Unbeknownst to participants, they were in fact completing the study on their own.
Participants were then given the choice of three avatars, presented on-screen in random order, one above the other. Participants were told that these avatars were the three avatars remaining after other participants had selected their avatars. The avatars were androgynous in appearance, and differed in terms of facial characteristics, hair length and hair style. Each avatar wore a black t-shirt, with the word "Smedd" written prominently on the front. Participants selected their avatar by clicking on the avatar of their choice.
Following avatar selection, participants were asked to provide their name or a pseudonym, which, they were told, would be displayed alongside their avatar in all subsequent tasks. They were told that other participants would similarly be providing a name or pseudonym, which would also be displayed alongside their avatar.
Participants were then asked to wait until other participants had (supposedly) selected their avatars. Participants waited seven seconds before they were told that all participants had selected their avatars.
Phase 2: Categorization Task. Next, participants were given instructions for an adapted version of a commonly-used categorization task (Taylor et al., 1978) , originally developed to explore the extent to which participants use social categories to organise social information. Participants were informed that they would be presented with a number of statements on-screen, one-by-one, displayed below the avatar of the participant to whom that statement was attributed. They were told that each of the participants, including themselves, was a member of either group Smedd or group Plibb, and that their group membership would be represented by the colour of the t-shirt worn by the avatar -black for Smedd and grey for Plibb -and by the word "Smedd" or "Plibb" written prominently across the front of the tshirt. Participants were then told that their task was to remember as many of the statements as 13 SELF-CATEGORIZATION AND SHARED ATTENTION responses of "Agree Strongly" or "Agree" for forward-coded items. These scores were then summed to create a final AQ score. A higher score on this measure indicates more autisticlike traits. The mean AQ in our sample was 21.72, with a range from 2 to 41.
A self-categorization index (SCI) was calculated by subtracting the number of between-category errors (incorrect person, incorrect group) that participants made in the attribution task from the number of within-category errors (incorrect person, correct group) that they made. A higher SCI score indicates more self-categorization. The mean SCI score in our sample was 1.12 with a range from -13 to +18.5.
A measure of ingroup shared attention was created by counting the number of words correctly remembered from the two lists viewed by members of group Smedd. The mean ingroup shared attention score was 5.64, with a range from 0 to 9. A measure of outgroup shared attention was created by counting the number of words correctly remembered from the two lists viewed by members of group Plibb. The mean outgroup shared attention score was 5.57, with a range from 0 to 9. Baron-Cohen (2005) and the shared-attention state described by Shteynberg (2010) appear to be distinct forms of cognitive representation. Multidimensional models of self-categorization (e.g., see McGarty, 1999, pp. 34-35, 119-120) , however, suggest that self, other, and object can simultaneously be viewed in terms of their triadic relations and in terms of a first-person plural representation.
H1: AQ and self-categorization
2. There is good reason to believe that categorization -and its social corollary selfcategorization -is a basic cognitive process, because its primary function of dividing sensory information into units of meaning is necessary for any adaptive response to the external environment. Nonetheless, it is possible that categorization and self-categorization can only arise following particular, specific inputs from the environment (consistent with a neuroconstructivist approach; Mareschal, 2011), such that the causals paths underlying a complex process such as shared attention would be dynamic and multi-directional. Mapping out this interplay in future research is crucial to understanding the causal antecedents of shared attention and social perception more generally. 
